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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PRIOR RESORT DocTRINE-REsORT TO
THE RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BoARD BEFORE CouRT AcTION-The

decision in a recent case 1 to the effect that a dispute concerning the construction of a contract of employment between a labor union and a
railroad may be adjusted by carrying it before the Railroad Adjustment
Board, or by carrying it directly to the courts makes this an apt time to
examine the applicability of the doctrine of prior resort 2 to disputes.
covered by the Railway Labor Act. 8 Such an examination seems especially necessary in view of the fact that in such cases the courts have not
even mentioned the doctrine.4

1 Southern Ry. Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, (D.C.S.C. 1945) 63 F. Supp.
306. The employer sought a declaratory judgment construing a contract of employment. The court held that prior resort to the National Railroad Adjustment Board was
unnecessary.
.
2 ln effect, this doctrine requires a litigant' to seek relief from an appropriate
administrative tribunal before invoking the aid of a court. This doctrine is also referred to as the "primary jurisdiction" rule and it has been said that it is the "keystone
of the arch of administrative regulation." 51 HARV. L. REv. 1251 (1938). This
comment will not be a complete discussion of the "prior resort" doctrine. For a fuller
discussion of the doctrine see Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action," 25 MINN. L. REV. 560 (1941); 51 HARV. L. REv. 1251
(1938); 35 CoL. L. REV. 230 (1935); 39 MicH. L. REv. 1408 (1941).
8 44 Stat. L. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. L. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
(1940) § 151, et seq.
4 The "prior resort" doctrine received some consideration in the case of Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, (C.C.A. D.C. 1941) 124 F. (2d) ·235 at 251
( I 941). In that case the employer sought relief in the courts after the administrative
machinery had been set in motion and the court decided that the employer was precluded from a resort to the courts.

COMMENTS

Su

The National Railroad Adjustment Board is made up of thirty-six
members, half selected from the carriers and half by the standard railroad unions. Such a membership is no doubt more familiar with the
language and conditions peculiar to railroads than judges or the ordinary juries would be. That there is such language can readily be seen
from an inspection of the reports of the proceedings before the Adjustment Board. 6 One reason given for the doctrine of prior resort is
that the members of an administrative tribunal are usually chosen
with a view toward their special qualifications in the field ih which the
cases demanding their decisions arise, and this special knowledge will
make for wiser decisions than if a court, generally unfamiliar with the
terms or conditions of a particular industry, handed'down a decision on
the same set of facts. 6 This reason is especially applicable to these disputes involving the interpretation of a collective agreement between a
carrier and its employees.
Another reason given for the doctrine is that by having administrative tribunals rule on the questions, a more uniform rule will be established. 7 If prior resort to the courts were allowed, there might conceivably be as many different rules on the same set of facts as there are
courts. Such uniformity could be attained by making prior resort to the
Adjustment Board a necessity.
Still another reason advanced for the prior resort doctrine is that
"it is part of the comity which one branch of the government owes to
another ...." 8 . This reason obviously applies where any administrative
tribunal is involved.
Inasmuch as the reasons for the prior resort doctrine are applicable
to the grievance disputes over which the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction, it seems that the doctrine should be observed unless the limitations upon the use of the doctrine apply. One of these limitations is
5

"The whole adjustment procedure up to the point of award, findings and order
by the "Board, appears to be constructed upon the idea that it is not the business of
lawyers but is the business of railroad men, workers and managers alike . • • • They
know the language, functions and purposes of railroads arid of their collective agreements. Their judgment is informed by experience in negotiating and administering
these contracts." Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, (C.C. D.C. 1941) 124 F.
(2d) 235 at 241. For an example of railroad vocabulary see Garrison, "The National
Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency," 46 YALE L. J. 567
at 569 (1937).
6
United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474, 52 S. Ct.
247 (1932); Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administr"ative
Action," 25 MINN. L. REv. 560 at 564 (1941); 51 HARV. L. REv. 1251 at 1252
(1938).
7
51 HARV. L. REv. 1251 at 1253 (1938).
8
27 CoL. L. REv. 450 at 452 (1927). However, one writer has indicated that
this consideration should be given only a minimum amount of importance. 3 5 CoL. L.
REv. 230 at 231, note 7 (1935).
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that the doctrine is not followed when the only question involved is a
legal question.9 It is debatable whether the interpretation of a contract
is a question of law or of fact, 10 but certainly it is not purely a legal
question. Since the doctrine has been extended to include certain questions of law, particularly those the answers to which are aided by or
depend in large degree upon technical knowledge, 11 and since the
Railway Labor Act gives the board jurisdiction over such questions,12
the above-stated limitation should not defeat the application of the
doctrine of prior resort in cases of this kind.
The doctrine is also inapplicable in those cases where the administrative remedy is not clearly available.13 It would seem that this limitation is the only possible justification for the trend of the decisions
ignoring the prior resort doctrine in cases involving the settlement of
grievances such as were relied on as precedent in the Southern Railway
case.14 It has been the practice of the Adjustment Board not to set
down claims by individual employees for hearing,15 with the result
that individual employees would have been left without a remedy
unless allowed to assert their claims in court.
,In the case of Evans v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company,16 an individual was allowed to resort to the courts ,without prior
resort to the Adjustment Board. The case involved the interpretationof a collective-bargaining contract. The court, in disposing of the defense that prior resort to the Adjustment Board was necessary, said that
"Decisions to the e:ffect that a failure to invoke administrative remedies
before the Interstate Commerce Commission or· other Federal administrative boards precluded or rendered premature a resort to the courts
were based upon statutes which by express terms or necessary implica9

Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action,"

25 MINN. L. REV. 560 at 566 (1941).
10 It has been said that a controversy involving the interpretation of a contract
is usually a legal question, but that "it also involves a special type of contract-a collective bargaining agreement • • ." the interpretation of which is a matter for the
· board's determination. 39 MICH. L. REv. 1408 at 1409 (1941). "The National
· Railroad Adjustment Board •.• is, so far as I know, the only administrative tribunal,
federal or state, which has ever been set up in this country for the purpose of rendering
judicially enforceable decisions in controversies arising out of the interpretation of
contracts." Garrison, "The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Admininstrative Agency," 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
_11 Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action,"
25 "f,1INN L. REv. 560 at 565 (1941).
12 Note 11, supra.
18
35 CoL. L. REV. 236 (1935).
14
Note 1, supra.
15 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITI'EE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 188 (1941).
16 191 Ga. 395, 12 S.E. (2d) 611 (1940), noted in 39 MICH. L. REv. 1408
(1941).
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tion gave to the administrative board exclusive jurisdiction or made the
exhausti0n of administrative remedies a condition precedent to judicial
action." 17 An inspection of the act 18 under which the prior resort doctrine has been held to be applicable 19 in respect to the Interstate Commerce Commission makes it difficult to sustain this view, for it reads
as follows:
" ... any person ... claiming to be damaged by any common
carrier ... may either make complaint to the Commission ... or
may bring suit in his ... own behalf for the recovery of damages
... in any district or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction ...."

If anything, this language seems to give more opportunity for concurrent jurisdic;tion than does the language embodied in the Railway
Labor Act. 20
In Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,21 an individual
employee brought an action for damages for an alleged wrongful discharge contrary to a collective agreement. The court held that the
Railway Labor Act did not preclude the employee from seeking relief
from the courts without first resorting to the Adjustment Board. The
Supreme Court followed much the same line of reasoning as was used
by the Georgia court in the Evans case.22
However, in the Southern Railway case 23 a federal district court
applied this reasoning to a situation where the plaintiff was a carrier
and, in effect, did away with the doctrine of prior resort, at least insofar
as the Railway Labor Act is concerned.
,
Conceivably, the Southern Railway decision may be reversed if it
1s appealed to the Supreme Court. In June, 1945, the Supreme
17

191 Ga. 395 at 401, 12 S.E. (2d) 6u (1940).
24 Stat, L. 379 at 382, c. 104,,§ 8 (1887).
19
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S. Ct.
350 (1906).
20
"(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier
or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of ,agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and
unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual matiner up to and
including the chief operating officer of the car-rier designated to handle such disputes;
but failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by
petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment
Board ••••" 45 U.S.C. (1940) § 153 (h), subdivision (i). (Italics supplied.)
It would seem that the courts could very easily hold that this section required the
parties to resort to the ordinary methods of grievance settlement, i.e., getting together
among themselves, before seeking relief from the Adjustment Board.
21
312 U.S. 630, 61 S. Ct. 754 (1941).
22
312 U.S. 630 at 635.
28
(D.C.S.C. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 306.
18
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Court 24 decided that an individual employee had the right to appear
before the Railroad Adjustment Board; so if the board allows an employee such a right in the future, it would seem that the only justifiable
reason for allowing concurrent jurisdiction has disappeared and consequently, the prior resort doctrine should be applied, not only where the
plaintiff is an employee, but also where the plaintiff is a union or a
carrier. There never has beeu a justification for allowing the latter
two to resort to the courts for an interpretation of a collective-bargaining contract before resorting to the Adjustment Board and there is even
less reason in view of the Elgin case.
William H. Buchanan, S.Ed.

24

Elgin,

J. &E. Ry. Co. v.

Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S. Ct. 1,282 (1945).

